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  This  paper  estimates  national  economic  parameters  to  be  used  for  project  appraisal  in 
Namibia. The shadow prices of capital, labour and foreign exchange are derived. The results 
suggest  that  the  economic  opportunity  cost  of  capital  is  7.2%.  The  economic  costs  of 
Namibian labour as a share of financial costs are 32% for urban semi- and unskilled labour, 
and are 54% for rural semi- and unskilled labour. The economic costs of foreign labour as a 
share of financial costs are 59%. The shadow exchange rate factor is estimated to be 4% for 
the Namibian economy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  estimate  shadow  prices  of  capital,  labour  and  foreign 
exchange for the Namibian economy. Shadow prices are defined as the opportunity costs of 
inputs  and  outputs  consumed  or  produced  by  a  project  (Potts  2002).  The  value  that  a 
resource could have generated elsewhere in the economy is lost if the resource is moved to 
a project. Therefore, shadow prices are calculated to take into account the true opportunity 
costs of resources, inputs and any externalities resulting from a developing programme or 
project. 
 
In many markets, especially in developing countries, financial or market values differ from 
their real economic values due to distortions brought about by imperfect or underdeveloped 
markets, government protection policies, and other externalities (Behrman 1986). The most 
emphasised distortions are with regard to unskilled labour, the cost of foreign exchange, 
and the cost of financial capital.  
 
Shadow  pricing  is  then  used  to  account  for  these  distortions  and  value  resources  to 
approximate their actual value. The use of unadjusted market prices for labour and capital 
might  lead  to  underestimating  the  real  costs  of  capital-intensive  projects  and  tend  to 
promote these at the expense of socially less costly labour-intensive projects. The existence 
of high levels of nominal and effective tariff protection, in combination with import quotas 
and overvalued exchange rates, discriminates against the agricultural sector in favour of the 
import-substituting manufacturing sector. In addition to reflecting – incorrectly – the real 







product  prices  tend  to  favour  upper-income  groups  disproportionately  in  relation  to 
society‟s lower-income groups. 
 
Thus,  the  estimation  of  shadow  prices  is  essential  for  the  practical  application  of  the 
economic analysis of project evaluation. By way of cost-benefit analysis, project evaluation 
aims to induce allocation efficiency in the use of a country‟s resources (Campbell & Brown 
2003). 
 
Despite its importance for sound developmental planning, the application of shadow pricing 
in Namibia has been limited or virtually non-existent. This is unfortunate as Namibia‟s 
development strategy, as encapsulated in the five-yearly National Development Plans and 
in its Vision 2030, underpins the importance of development/investment programmes in 
addressing  the  challenges  of  poverty,  high  unemployment  and  inequality,  and  low 
industrialisation.
2 Moreover, the launch in 2004 of  the Development Bank of Namibia to 
fund long-term infrastructure projects increases the need to understand the economic costs 
and benefits of its funded projects. Potential large-scale projects such as the development of 
the Kudu gas fields, transfrontier tourism parks, and other infrastructure projects would 
need to be assessed on both financial and economic grounds. Thus, the practical application 
of shadow pricing in the economic analyses of Namibia‟s development projects would help 
ensure that its scarce resources are optimally utilised, and would help attain the country‟s 
targets as set out in its development strategy. 
                                                 
2 Shadow prices are consistently used in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), but these are based 
on educated guesswork rather than real estimates. This framework assumes the economic opportunity cost of 
capital at 8%, an adjustment (up by 6%) to the value of tradable goods to reflect excess demand for foreign 







Estimating shadow prices for the Namibian economy is also interesting from an academic 
point of view. Namibia has special features that are not commonly found among other 
developing countries. Namibia‟s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$3,100, at 
2005  market  exchange  rates,  is  relatively  high  for  a  developing  country.  However, 
according to the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators for 2006, Namibia has the 
world‟s highest Gini index (74.3, compared with Botswana‟s 63 and South Africa‟s 57.8).
3 
This implies an uneven income distribution  that amplifies the interest to estimate shadow 
wage rates. 
 
The  Namibian  economy has a large service sector (around 58 .7% of GDP), which is 
unusual for a developing country. In addition, independence in 1990 brought considerable 
changes to the economy‟s external and internal migration patterns, especially in relation to 
the  labour  market.  According  to  Frayne  and  Pendleton  (2001),  internal  migration  and 
urbanisation  in  Namibia  is  growing  rapidly,  and  is  driven  largely  by  employment 
opportunities in urban centres. In the 1990s, the population of Windhoek, the capital city, 
grew at an average annual rate of 5.4%. Overall, no substantial research has been done in 
Namibia on either the scale or the possible consequences of skills emigration. However, 
according to preliminary analyses by Frayne and Pendleton (2001, 2002) and the Migration 
Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA 2006), Namibian migratory labour (both skilled and 
unskilled)  to  South  Africa  (SA)  and  other  neighbouring  countries  is  very  limited:  the 
overall net migration is estimated at 0.47 per 1,000 members of the population. 
 
                                                 







Furthermore, unlike most other developing countries, Namibia is a net capital exporter. 
Although the economy has high domestic savings, these flow out mostly to SA to seek 
higher returns. The lack of domestic investment opportunities is cited as one reason for 
persistent capital outflows (Fitch Ratings 2005). These capital outflows amount to 10% of 
GDP annually, and continue unabated.
4 
 
The  linkages  to  SA  are  not  only  restricted  to  Namibia‟s  capital  outflows.  The  two 
economies are members in regional groupings such as Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU),  the  Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC),  and  the  Common 
Monetary Area (CMA). Namibia‟s currency is pegged to the SA Rand, while 82% of her 
total  imports  are  from  SA.  Some  26%  of  Namibia‟s  total  exports  go  to  SA.  The  SA 
economy, being the regional economic powerhouse, is approximately 30 times the size of 
Namibia‟s. 
 
Recent work by Harberger et al. (2003), Kuo et al. (2003) and Bicak et al. (2004) has 
estimated shadow prices for the SA  economy for labour, capital and foreign exchange. 
Since these two countries share similar historical political ties and a current close economic 
relationship, it would be interesting to compare the results from this work with those from 
                                                 
4 An anonymous reviewer suggests that this could be a symptom of „Dutch disease‟. However, unlike most 
other primary product exporters, the Dutch disease phenomenon appears to be a limited risk to Namibia (IMF 
2008). This is because Namibian mineral exports have a relatively modest and decreasing share of GDP (20–
25%). This share actually overstates domestic expenditures by the mineral sector, as it imports most of its 
capital equipment and its labour costs are very low (it contributes 2% of national employment). In addition, 
fiscal revenues from the sector average around 2–3% of GDP. Thus, domestic pricing pressures from the 







the SA studies. However, given Namibia‟s special features not common to a developing 
economy,  it  can  reasonably  be  expected  for  estimates  of  the  two  economies‟  national 
parameters to be different. 
 
This work will be the first formal exercise to estimate shadow prices for the Namibian 
economy.  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  2  discusses  economic  features 
pertinent  to  the  estimation  of  Namibian  shadow  prices;  Section  3  treats  approaches  to 
shadow pricing as well as the methodology to be employed; Section 4 describes the data 
employed as well as the assumptions used for each estimate; Section 5 presents the results; 
and Section 6 concludes the discussion. 
 
2.  FEATURES OF THE ECONOMY PERTINENT TO AN ESTIMATION OF 
SHADOW PRICES 
 
2.1  Capital market dynamics 
 
The Namibian financial markets exhibit special features that will affect the estimation of a 
shadow price of capital. As mentioned earlier, overall limited investment opportunities in 
domestic financial markets have led to sizable outflows of Namibian savings into the liquid 
and relatively developed South African markets. Membership in the CMA also allows for 
free capital flows, and requires Namibia to conform to South African exchange control 
practices for countries outside the CMA. These outflows averaged around N$1.8 billion per 
year from 1990–1994, and accelerated to about N$2.4 billion per year from 1995 to 2007. 
Net outflows in both portfolio and other investments drive the capital outflows. 







The Namibian economy is primarily resource-based and, thus, has some investments that 
are highly profitable owing to resource rents. Resource rents are economic profits that are 
obtained by utilising natural resources. These rents exist due to the scarcity of the natural 
resources in question. Such rents can be an important source of development finance, and 
countries like Botswana and Malaysia have successfully leveraged natural resources this 
way. However, in sectors that do not have resource rents, the marginal product of capital 
appears to drop sharply since many funds are invested outside Namibia. 
 
To stem capital outflows, the Namibian authorities have followed a two-pronged strategy: 
firstly, imposing regulatory controls to restrict capital outflows, and secondly, developing 
domestic markets to provide institutional investors with assets denominated in Namibia 
Dollars. The latter strategy is still in its infancy and has not been developed. In the mid 
1990s, the Namibian authorities raised regulatory requirements for both the insurance and 
pension fund industries (Regulations 15 and 28, respectively), so that 35% of the assets 
under their management had to be domestic assets (up from an earlier 10%). This action 
contributed  to  the  growth  of the Namibian Stock Exchange due to an increase in dual 
listings  by  South  African  companies.  However,  even  investments  in  such  dual-listed 
companies were unable to contain capital outflows, and the regulation may not have had 
much impact on the real economy. As a result, government has proposed further changes to 
tighten the domestic asset requirements. A 5% minimum for unlisted investments and a 
10% maximum on dual-listed shares were among the new proposals gazetted on 4 February 
2008. 







2.2  Labour market dynamics 
 
The Namibian labour market is governed by a policy framework that includes a Labour 
Act, a Social Security Act, an Employment Policy, an Affirmative Action (Employment) 
Act, and incentives for investment and training. However, on balance, unemployment and 
underemployment remain high. According to the latest Labour Force Survey, conducted in 
2004, unemployment was estimated at 36%. The Bank of Namibia Annual Report for 2004 
states that underemployment was estimated at 15% of the employed population. Motinga 
and Tutalife (2006) indicate that Namibia created a mere 22,000 formal jobs between 1991 
and  2001.  Unemployment  falls  disproportionately  on  the  youth  and  the  unskilled 
workforce,  while  the  duration  of  unemployment  is  longer  in  rural  areas,  and  can  vary 
between six months and two years (ibid). 
 
There is also evidence of wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled. Motinga and 
Mohammed (2002) calculated that the average unskilled person earns 3% of the wages and 
salaries of top management, and less than 50% of what the average skilled person earns. 
Westergaard-Nielsen et al. (2003) confirm the huge wage differentials between skilled and 
unskilled labour. Although there is no formal minimum wage legislation, some industry-
specific  wage  agreements  do  contain  stipulations  for  minimum  wages,  namely  the 
construction, agriculture, and security industries. There is also a large informal economy 
employing at least 133,000 people, of whom 64% are young people. Remuneration in this 
sector is very low, and there are no benefits such as social security or medical aid. 
 
The presence of a large informal economy and minimum wages, both of which lead to 







case  for  such  an  economic  adjustment  on  the  grounds  of  imperfections  in  the  labour 
markets. The informal economy, which consists of large numbers of small-scale businesses, 
can be reasonably assumed to be a sector with market-clearing wages. In the formal sector, 
however,  the  presence  of  minimum  wages  and  collective  bargaining  –  and,  possibly, 
efficiency wage issues – leads to wages above the market-clearing levels that exist in the 
informal economy. As a result, a portion of the 36% unemployed Namibians would prefer 
formal jobs, but cannot get them due to the presence of these distortions. 
 
2.3  Issues in estimating the foreign exchange premium 
 
Namibia‟s  participation in  SACU  affects  the estimation  of the shadow price of foreign 
exchange (Shadow Exchange Rates, or SERs). SACU groups Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
SA and Swaziland together under a common external tariff. All customs and excise duties 
collected by the five SACU members are combined in a Common Revenue Pool (CRP), 
and distributed to them according to a Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF). The sharing of the 
revenue from customs duties is determined on the basis of each country‟s percentage share 
of total intra-SACU imports, excluding re-exports, and not on the basis of SACU imports 
from the rest of the world (Flatters & Stern 2005; Kirk & Stern 2005). 
 
Some 82% of Namibian imports are from SA, which increases Namibia‟s share of revenue 
from the SACU system (due to the RSF‟s intra-SACU imports rule). Namibian imports 
from outside SACU (the remaining 20% of her total imports) are subject to SACU tariffs, 
but generate very little extra SACU revenue for Namibia: tariff revenues are paid into the 
SACU system, and Namibia only gets a small portion of that. Most Namibian exports are to 







Thus, since SACU revenue for Namibia is effectively not linked to the country‟s out-of-
SACU imports, it can be argued that SACU receipts are not relevant to the determination of 
the shadow exchange rate since they are essentially intergovernmental transfers and do not 
directly affect the relationship between prices of traded goods at world prices and their 
domestic  prices.  Moreover,  the  SACU  revenue  pool  is  gradually  declining  due  to 
continuing trade negotiations at multilateral and regional levels. 
 
Namibia is part of the CMA, which also includes Lesotho, SA and Swaziland.
5 Apart from 
Botswana, the CMA has four of the same member countries as SACU; thus, there should be 
two SERs: one for convertible currency external to the CMA , and one for Rand -based 
currencies that would have an SER of 1 since there are no trade restrictions between CMA 
members.  The SER to be calculated in this work , therefore, is applicable to transactions 
with countries outside the CMA, but not to the foreign content of goods purchased from 
SA.  In principle, one would expect the SER  – in relation to external economies – to be 
similar for all members of the CMA because they all use the same tariff structure. However, 
there might be some variation due to differences in the structure of imports. 
                                                 
5 The CMA is described as an area of coordination between the monetary and exchange rate policies of its 
members under the Multilateral Monetary Agreement of 1992. Under the CMA, the Namibian currency is 
linked one-to-one to the South African Rand, which is also legal tender. The CMA also guarantees free capital 
flows among member countries, and guarantees access for Namibian government and financial institutions to 







3.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK (METHODOLOGY) 
 
This section describes the analytical framework to be used in estimating shadow prices in 
Namibia.  Generally,  there  are  two  approaches  to  shadow  pricing  that  hinge  on  the 
assumption of the existence of market distortions (Medalla 1982). The first approach may 
be generalised as an attempt to estimate shadow prices associated with a first-best optimum. 
In  this  approach,  if  market  and  shadow  prices  diverge  due  to  policy  failures,  then  the 
appropriate  shadow  prices  would  be  the  equilibrium  prices  that  would  prevail  if  the 
distortions  were  removed.  However,  if  the  divergence  is  caused  by  market  rather  than 
policy failures, then the absence of first-best corrective measures is itself the essence of the 
problem of non-optimality. The work by Tinbergen (1958) and Bacha and Taylor (1971) in 
the case of shadow pricing of foreign exchange is associated with this first approach. As 
Medalla  (1982)  states,  however,  this  approach  is  not  yet  feasible  for  shadow  pricing 
primary factors such as capital and labour due to inadequate techniques and data. 
 
The second approach treats present distortions as given and assumes that they might persist 
over  the  long  run  (Medalla  1982).  Shadow  pricing  is  then  a  problem  of  deriving  dual 
solutions  to  the  welfare  optimisation  problem,  while  the  distortions  are  treated  as 
constraints. Under this approach the optimisation problem is usually not formally specified, 
but  it forms  the  conceptual framework  for shadow pricing  rules.  The  resulting shadow 
prices are referred to as second-best shadow prices, representing social costs and benefits of 
inputs at the second-best optimum. This approach is associated with the work of Little and 
Mirrlees (1969), Harberger (1972), and Dasgupta et al. (1972). 







In this paper we follow Harberger‟s (1972) approach for two principal reasons. Firstly, 
according to Khan (1979), this is the correct method of estimating the shadow discount rate, 
namely where the marginal social value is not equal to the marginal social cost of funds at 
the  market  equilibrium  due  to  the  presence  of  various  distortions.  Finally,  and  most 
importantly, utilising this  approach will enable  comparison of the  results  with  those  of 
Harberger et al. (2003), Kuo et al. (2003). and Bicak et al. (2004) for South Africa. 
 
3.1  The discount rate 
 
The economic literature advances four main methods of computing the discount rate .These 
are the Social Rate of Time Preference (SRTP), the Weighted Opportunity Cost of Capital 
(SOC), the Shadow Price of Capital (SPC), and the Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital 
(EOCK).
6  In terms of applicability, only the  SRTP and the EOCK are feasible for the 
Namibian estimations. However, a brief review of first three methods is  presented, with a 
more substantial review of the EOCK method, which allows for comparison with the South 
African work. 
 
3.1.1  The Social Rate of Time Preference approach 
 
The SRTP approach is where the discount rate is composed of two factors: the first is a pure 
rate of time preference based on people‟s desire to gain short-term gratification, and the 
                                                 
6 See Boardman et al. (2001), Boscolo et al. (1998), Percoco & Nijkamp (2006), Powers (2003), and Zhuang 
et al. (2007). These sources offer an excellent and detailed review of the major methods on estimating the 







second an assumption that per capita consumption will grow over time. The formula for the 
SRTP is given by the following equation: 
 
  g r       (1) 
 
where    is the utility discount rate,    is the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal 
utility of consumption, and g is the projected long-run annual growth of real consumption 
per capita. The advantage of the SRTP approach is its applicability to the Namibian work 
on discount rates. 
 
3.1.2  The Weighted Social Opportunity Cost of Capital approach 
 
The SOC approach is grounded on the notion that public investment crowds out private 
investment,  thus  producing  the  need  to  account  for  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  use  of 
resources used in the public project, and which could be used by the private sector. The 
SOC  could  be  approximated  by  the  marginal  pre-tax  rate  of  return  on  riskless  private 
investments. 
 
Zhuang et al. (2007) mention that a good proxy to be used is the real pre-tax rate of top-
rated corporate bonds. The application of the SOC is still contentious, however, both on 
practical and theoretical grounds. A practical difficulty arises since the computation of the 
SOC relies on a vast array of possible private sector interest rates which may not be readily 
available. Some theoretical  objections  to  the SOC  follow the argument  that the private 
sector return may reflect individual rather than societal premium for risk. This argument is 







individuals. Thus, a rate based purely on the pre-tax return in investment may overestimate 
the discount rate: thereby making it more difficult to obtain a benefit-cost ratio of greater 
than 1, particularly for projects of a longer tenure (Powers 2003). 
 
3.1.3  The Shadow Price of Capital approach 
 
This SPC approach postulates that, while the costs of a public project can displace private 
investments, its benefits can also be reinvested in the private sector. Thus, it proposes to 
convert the gains or losses from an investment project into consumption equivalents. The 
proper conversion rate is  then the shadow price of capital  (Percoco &  Nijkamp 2006). 
Estimating the SPC is relatively simple if it is assumed that each dollar invested today 
yields a perpetual return π that is entirely consumed (Boscolo et al. 1998). Thus, the present 
vale of the annual flow of consumption is given by π/i, where i is the SRTP. By implication, 
π/i is the shadow price of investments in terms of consumption. A simple formula that 
applies  when  investment  returns  are  perpetual  but  a  proportion  of  the  annual  return  is 
reinvested is derived as –  
 









1   (2) 
 
where γ=(1+π)/(1+i), s is the marginal propensity to save, and  sγ<1. The shadow price 
increases with the fraction of π invested. The SPC is conceptually correct as it allows the 
use  of  the  SRTP  as  the  social  discount  rate  without  ignoring  the  opportunity  cost  of 
displaced investment. However, its practical applicability is constrained due to its stringent 







3.1.4  The Economic Opportunity Cost of Capital 
 
Finally, the EOCK approach postulates that in a small, open, developing economy like 
Namibia‟s, there are three alternative sources of public funds. The first is from individual 
savers who take resources that would have been spent on private consumption and instead 
then lead to an increase in domestic savings. The second source is from additional foreign 
capital inflows. The third is from resources whose investment has either been displaced or 
postponed by the project‟s extraction of funds from the capital market (Harberger 1972). 
Based on these three alternative sources of public funds, the economic cost of capital can be 
estimated as a weighted average of the rate of time preference applicable to – 
  additional savings 
  the marginal cost of additional foreign inflows, and 
  the rate of return on displaced or postponed investments. 
 
In general, various distortions are associated with each of the three alternative sources of 
funds. 
 
If the weights of these three sources are expressed in terms of elasticities of demand and 
supply of funds with respect to changes in interest rates, the economic opportunity cost of 




    
 
    

) / ( ) / (
) / ( ) / (
t f f t r s
f t f f t r s
S S S S
MC S S S S
EOCK   (3) 







For a country such as Namibia, with a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility, and a 
highly elastic supply of foreign funds, Zerbe and Dively (1994) point out that the social 
discount rate will be equal to the international borrowing rate. For Namibia, where the 
foreign funds are domestic savings, this will be the foreign lending rate (approximately 
equivalent to South African bond returns, or the returns on other South African financial 
instruments in which surplus Namibian assets are placed). Thus, in the standard EOCK 
formula  (Equation  3  above),  the  elasticity  of  foreign  funds  becomes  extremely  high 














  (4) 
 
The EOCK in (4) essentially equals the real rate of return from investing Namibian funds in 
South  African  long-term  financial  instruments.  South  African  assets  constitute 
approximately  80%  of  both  total  and  portfolio  investments  from  Namibia  (IMF  2008). 
Therefore, a good proxy for the amended EOCK will be the average rate of return on long-
term investments in South African bond instruments. 
 
3.2  Economic Opportunity Cost of Labour 
 
The  EOCL  reflects  the  value  to  the  economy  of  the  set  of  activities  given  up  by  the 
workers,  including  the  non-market  costs  (or  benefits)  associated  when  they  change 
employment from one project to another (Harberger & Jenkins 2002). Two approaches are 
generally  applied  in  estimating  the  EOCL:  the  value  of  marginal  product  of  labour 







Under the value of marginal product of labour forgone approach, the EOCL is estimated by 
starting with the gross-of-tax alternative wage earned in previous employment by the labour 
hired for the new project (marginal product foregone), and then adjusting for differences in 
other  costs  and  benefits.  Under  the  supply  price  of  labour  approach,  the  EOCL  is 
determined by starting with the gross-of-tax market wage (the supply price) required to 
attract sufficient workers to the project, and then adjusting for distortions such as taxes and 
subsidies. The two approaches have different data requirements, levels of computational 
complexity,  and  hence,  different  degrees  of  operational  usefulness  (Bicak  et  al.  2004). 
However, it can be shown that, theoretically, the two approaches will produce the same 
result in estimating the EOCL. Since the supply price of labour is more straightforward and 
easier  to  use  under  a  wide  variety  of  conditions  in  the  labour  market,  and  the  two 
approaches are equivalent when data are available, the supply price approach is used. 
 
Bicak et al. (2004) also use the supply price of labour approach, making it easy to compare 
the South African and Namibian results. It appears that the Namibian labour market does 
not feature any special characteristics other than those of high wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labour, and the large informal economy. There is little international 
migration, although interregional migration to urban areas is high.
7 Thus, a new project is 
most likely to attract workers from both the formal and informal sectors , as well as some 
foreign labour, if needed; but it may also attract some skilled Namibians currently working 
in South Africa. 
                                                 
7 Harris and Todaro (1970) postulate that high urban unemployment rates could be explained by rationally 
behaving unskilled rural migrants seeking to maximise expected income. According to this model, more than 
one rural worker is likely to migrate for each new job created in the urban sector. The effect of this is that the 







It appears that skilled labour is in scarce supply in Namibia, with very little – if any – 
unemployment experienced in this sector (LARRI 2005, 2006a; Marope 2005). Managers 
and professionals earn annual remunerations of between N$250,000 to N$400,000. Around 
4% unemployment is found among those with a university education. In such a case, the 
opportunity cost of skilled labour is assumed to equal the domestic market wage (Potts 
2002). In this paper, therefore, we concentrate on the shadow prices for unskilled labour 
and for foreign labour. 
 
The presence of a large informal economy presents the opportunity to determine the free 
market  wage  at  which  everyone  could  work.  From  the  Labour  Resource  and  Research 
Institute (LARRI 2006b),  the free market  wage can  be  estimated at  N$175 per month. 
Certain Namibian industries, as alluded to in Section 2 above, have minimum wages, and 
many wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements. In such markets, the wage 
rates are above their market clearing rates (Bicak et al. 2004). Because of the minimum 
wage  rates,  chronic  unemployment  exists  in  this  segment  of  the  labour  market.    The 
illustration in Figure 1 shows how the EOCL for protected jobs can be determined under 












Figure 1: Estimating the Economic Opportunity Cost of Labour for protected sector jobs 
 
Let Wp be the protected sector wage, and let the supply curve of labour for those who are 
not formally employed be given by WoSi. Let Li be the people who are willing to work at 
Wi, and let Lq be quasi-unemployed willing to work at Wp but not at Wi. To simplify the 
analysis, Wi is assumed to be the free market at which everyone could work if they wished. 
The intersection of this supply curve and the free market wage rate of Wi   determine the 
number of people willing to work at this wage, or Li in Figure 1. In the Namibian case, Wi   
would be the informal market wage. 
 
When a project creates a demand for protected workers, such demand will be met partly by 
those working in the free market (i.e. the informal economy in our case), and partly by 
quasi-voluntarily unemployed workers (Bicak et al. 2004). If it were assumed that workers 
are recruited randomly from among all those willing to work for the protected sector wage, 
the economic cost of these jobs would be measured by the weighted average of the free 
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then fall between the free market wage (i.e. the informal economy wage in our case) and the 
protected wage rate. In the case of linear supply curves, the average supply price of the 
quasi-voluntarily  unemployed  is  measured  by  (Wi  +  Wp)/2.  If  any  tax  adjustments  are 
ignored, then the EOCL for protected sector jobs can be expressed as follows: 
 
  EOCLp = f1 Wi + f2 (Wi + Wp)/2  (5) 
 
where f1 and f2, respectively, represent the proportions of the project jobs being filled by 
those now working in the informal economy and those filled by unemployed individuals 
who were waiting for new protected project jobs to become available. 
 
The EOCL for skilled foreign labour will be measured by the net-of-tax wage that the 
worker receives in Namibia, plus an adjustment for the foreign exchange premium that is an 
additional cost  on the share of wages  the  foreign worker remits back  home. A second 
adjustment is related to the goods and services that foreign workers consume in Namibia. If 
foreign workers pay any excise or value added taxes on the goods they purchase, these 
taxes should be deducted from the cost of foreign labour, as they do not represent a cost to 
the Namibian economy. In some cases, temporary foreign workers might receive subsidised 
housing or health benefits, for example. These should be added to the EOCL. Combining 
these factors, the economic opportunity cost of labour for foreign workers (EOCL
F) can be 










VAT  (6) 








F is the gross-of-tax wage of foreign labour, t
F is the rate of personal income tax 
levied by the host country on foreign wages and salaries, R is the proportion of the net-of-
tax income repatriated by foreign labour, E
e is the economic exchange rate, E
m is the market 
exchange rate, and t
VAT is the average rate of value added tax paid. 
 
For labour from South Africa – the main source of skilled foreign labour – coming to work 








VAT  (7) 
 
Similarly, for Namibian skilled labour attracted back home by the project from out-of-





RSA)R  (8) 
 
3.3  Economic Opportunity Cost of Foreign Exchange 
 
The wedge between the Shadow Exchange Rate (SER) and the Official Exchange Rate 
(OER) can be attributed to a combination of two factors: disequilibria in the balance of 
payments (BOP) and in the protection structure (Medalla & Powers 1984). Namibia does 
not suffer from a BOP disequilibrium, but does have trade restrictions through SACU. An 
SER  higher  than  the  OER  reflects  the  premium  placed  on  foreign  exchange  (used  or 
produced) when evaluating projects to correct the distorted relative prices between traded 
and  non-traded  commodities.  A  higher  SER  does  not  suggest  devaluation  but  rather 







arises  from  the  protection  system  (and  BOP  disequilibrium)  and  not  only  affects  price 
relationships among tradable goods, but also distorts the prices of tradables relative to non-
tradables.  Among  tradable  commodities,  relative  price  distortion  may  be  corrected  in 
project  evaluation  by  using  their  relative  border  prices.  However,  further  correction  is 
needed for the price distortion between tradables and non-tradables. This, in essence, is the 
role of the SER in project evaluation. It serves as the conversion factor for non-tradables, 
making their prices consistent with the border prices of tradables. One would ideally prefer 
to compute a specific conversion factor for each non-tradable rather than use a standard 
conversion factor such as the SER, but due to the practicalities involved in decomposing 
non-tradables  into  their  tradable  and  primary  factor  components,  the  SER  is  easier  to 
compute. 
 
Lagman-Martin (2004) mentions three alternative approaches to estimating the SER. These 
approaches are generally based on converting the OER to the SER through a conversion 
factor known as the SER factor (SERF). The first approach is employed where an economy 
enjoys  balanced  trade.  The  formula  applied  involves  calculating  the  SER  based  on  the 
tariff-adjusted OER, weighted according to import–export shares. A second approach takes 
into account the sustainability of the country‟s trade imbalance through an assessment of 
the Equilibrium Exchange Rate (EER). The use of the EER rather than the OER emphasises 
the  long-term  stability  of  the  exchange  rate  because  of  its  significant  effect  on  project 
performance. Finally, in the third approach, when tariffs represent the only distortion to 
trade  and  there  are  no  distortions  in  factor  or  commodity  prices,  the  SERF  can  be 
approximated by 1 plus the weighted average tariff rate. This approach is consistent with 
the accepted definition of the SER as the weighted average of the demand price for foreign 
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where M is the total value of imports (cif – cost, insurance, freight), X is the total value of 
exports (fob – free on board), Mt is total value of import taxes, Xt is the total value of export 
taxes, TT is the total value of trade, NTt is the total value of net trade taxes, and Ms and Xs 
represent import and export subsidies, respectively. 
 
Other, more complex, formulas for the SER can be derived if data are available to indicate 
the types of imports or exports that change with a concomitant change in the availability of 
foreign exchange. Such formulas use the elasticity of demand for imports and exports with 
respect to changes in foreign exchange availability to provide weights for different export 
and import categories. It is usually very difficult to obtain reliable information on these 
elasticities, so the simple weighted formulas are commonly used. Harberger et al. (2003) 
employ a general equilibrium model to estimate the SER for South Africa. Their approach 
illustrates how the foreign exchange premium could be estimated in an economy where the 
funds used to finance the purchase of tradable and non-tradable goods are obtained via the 
capital markets. This framework ensures that all repercussions in the economy due to the 
purchase of tradable goods for a project are taken into account in a consistent manner. Due 
to data limitations, this work will employ the simple weighted trade formula presented 







average of the conversion factors for traded goods. The question as to which formula to use 
is essentially an empirical one (Potts 2002). 
 
4.  DATA 
 
The data are derived from various sources. For the shadow price of capital estimations, the 
inflation data are derived from the Central Bureau of Statistics‟ National Accounts from 
1996 to 2006, and from the Bank of Namibia‟s quarterly and annual reports. The rate of 
return from investing Namibian assets in South African long-term bond instruments was 
obtained from a local consulting firm, Jacques Malan Consultant and Actuaries.  
 
For the SRTP calculations, we follow Evans and Sezer (2004), where the rate of pure time 
preference    is assumed to be 1.5%, the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption   is 
assumed to be 1.3, and the average growth rate of per capita real consumption g is the 
average annual  growth rate per capital  real GDP from 1996 to 2006, derived from the 
National Accounts data. The g was 2.87% over the 1996–2006 period. 
 
The  labour  estimations  used  LARRI‟s  Actual  Wage  Rate  Database,  the  results  of  the 
LARRI  labour  force  survey  conducted  in  2004,  the  Ministry  of  Labour‟s  survey  on 
Namibia‟s informal economy in 2001, and LARRI‟s study on that economy in 2006. In 
terms of unskilled labour, we will use the minimum wages determined by LARRI (2005, 
2006a) for the various economic sectors in Namibia. The database is derived from wage 
agreements entered into between various trade unions and corporate entities between 2000 







also look at special categories such as farm workers and security guards, who are formally 
paid a minimum wage as set out by legislation. 
 
LARRI (2006b) shows that, on average, the majority of informal workers get paid N$175 
per month. The estimated number of people working in the informal sector is 133,000. 
Unfortunately,  there  are  no  disaggregated  data  available  on  rural  and  urban  wages. 
Therefore, wages for the informal sector as well as for farm workers are used as a proxy for 
rural semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The labour force survey of 2004 estimates that 
108,119 people are unemployed. Using these data, we obtain f1 at 0.55, f2 at 0.45, and Wf at 
N$175 to estimate the EOCL equation. For urban semi-and unskilled labour, Wp is the 
LARRI database‟s average national wage, namely N$1,475 per month. For rural workers, 
the Wp is the farm workers‟ minimum wage of N$428 per month. For estimating the EOCL 
of foreign labour, t
F is 35%, with t
VAT at 15%, and Ee/Em being the SERF calculated in this 
study. Finally, we assume R (the proportion of the net-of-tax income repatriated by foreign 
labour) at 40%. 
 
Namibian trade statistics to estimate the forex premium were obtained directly from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and the Bank of Namibia reports. 
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
5.1  Discount rate estimations 
 
The discount rate estimations using the amended EOCK formula yielded the following: 







Table 1: Discount rate calculations: Results of estimations 
Method  Discount rate 
Amended EOCK  7.2% 
SRTP  5.3% 
 
The amended EOCK is 7.2%, whilst the results of the SRTP are 5.3%. Thus, the estimates 
are slightly lower than the informal estimate of 8% from Barnes (1994). The work by Kuo 
et al. (2003) estimates the South African EOCK at 11%, which is higher than our estimates. 
 
Zhuang et al. (2007) mention that a major criticism of using SRTP is that it is purely a 
measure of the social opportunity cost in terms of foregone consumption, and that it ignores 
the fact that public projects could also crowd out private sector investments if they cause 
the market interest rate to rise.  Therefore, it is necessary to reflect what society could have 
gained from the displaced private investment that can be measured by the marginal social 
rate of return on private sector investment. As the SRTP is generally low, if it is exclusively 
used as  the social  discount  rate  it may  lead to  too  many  low-return investments  being 
undertaken in the public sector. 
 
5.2  EOCL estimation results 
 
The results of the EOCL estimations are presented in Tables 2 and 3 below: 







Table 2: EOCL estimations 
Namibian minimum wage, by sector  Three-year 
average 
2003–2005 
EOCL  Economic costs 
as share of 
financial costs 
(%) 
Wi  assumed at 
N$175 
Agriculture / hunting / fishing / forestry  1,256  417  33 
Community services / social services / personal 
services 
1,676  511  31 
Construction  1,415  452  32 
Manufacturing  1,366  441  32 
Mining and quarrying  1,812  542  30 
Transport and storage  1,693  515  30 
Wholesale and retail trade  1,104  383  35 
National average  1,410  452  32 
Economic costs as share of financial costs      32% 
 
Table 3: EOCL estimations of special categories 
Special categories  Protected 
wages 
EOCL   Economic costs 
as share of 
financial costs 
(%) 
Wi assumed at N$175 
Farm workers  428  231  54 
Security guards  588  267  46 
EOCL of foreign labour factor  n/a  n/a  59 
EOCL of Namibian expatriates  n/a  n/a  28 
 
The EOCL estimations show that, as a share of financial costs, economic costs are 32% for 
Namibian urban semi- and unskilled labour, and around 54% for rural semi- and unskilled 
labour. The economic costs of foreign labour and Namibian expatriates are 59% and 28% of 







the economic cost was 35% of the financial cost for all unskilled labour. The estimations by 
Bicak et al. (2004) show the South African accounting price of unskilled labour at 60%, 
whilst their Namibian counterpart is at 32%. The South African accounting price for foreign 
labour is 73%, whereas the Namibian estimations yielded an accounting price of 59%. 
 
5.3  SERF estimation results 
 
The results of the SERF estimation are presented in Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4: SERF estimations (imports and exports for trade with countries outside SACU) 
SERF estimations  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999 
Imports (cif) (N$)  48,494,118  39,233,302  21,112,383  19,137,768  29,366,773  22,431,392 
Exports (fob) (N$)  81,766,641  117,776,370  64,175,570  55,621,342  52,919,528  27,512,564 
Import taxes (N$)  7,185,927  6,362,725  2,314,213  2,503,542  3,714,767  3,103,544 
Export taxes (N$)     29,733      25,727      9,044      9,832     10,279      7,241  
Net trade taxes (N$)  7,156,193  6,336,998  2,305,169  2,493,710  3,704,488  3,096,303 
Total trade (N$)  130,260,759  157,009,672  85,287,953  74,759,110  82,286,301  49,943,956 
SERF  1.05  1.04  1.03  1.03  1.05  1.06 
SERF, six-year 
average 
1.04           
 
The SERF estimations indicate a value of 1.04. A more general point is that the SER is not 
a precise figure since it will be used in projections into an uncertain future. Therefore, there 
are grounds for using a central approximation (or best estimate) and doing some sensitivity 
tests around the central value. Thus, in appraising projects, it is best to apply a sensitivity 







estimate a value of 6.2% for the South African economy, which is higher than this work‟s 
estimate. As mentioned earlier in the paper, these estimates are for out-of-SACU trades as 
the SERF for SACU is 1. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This has been the first formal attempt at estimating national economic parameters for the 
Namibian economy. 
 
In terms of the amended EOCK, the lower value of 7.2% – compared with SA‟s 11% – 
clearly reflects the Namibian net saver position. The estimate is also close to the Barnes 
(1994) guesstimate, which has been used for the last 14 years. The SRTP low value of 5.3% 
is best used for public projects that are unlikely to displace private investments, such as 
food-for-work programmes and other non-profit public sector initiatives. On the other hand, 
the EOCL estimations for farm workers, which are used as a proxy for semi- and unskilled 
rural labour, are much higher than the Barnes (1994) guesstimates. The SER estimate, while 
lower than the Barnes (1994) guesstimates of 6%, is for out-of-SACU trades which the 
latter work did not realise or incorporate. 
 
The results should be useful for efficient and sustainable development planning in Namibia. 
Further extensions and enhancements of this work should entail estimating shadow prices 
using input–output analyses in order to estimate conversion factors for the various sectors 









Bacha, E & L Taylor (1971): “Foreign exchange shadow prices: A critical review of current 
theses”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(1):197–224. 
Bank of Namibia (Various): Annual Reports. Windhoek: Bank of Namibia. 
Bank of Namibia (Various): Quarterly Bulletins. Windhoek: Bank of Namibia. 
Barnes, JI (1994): “Suggested criteria for shadow pricing in the cost–benefit analysis of 
projects in Namibia”. Mimeo. Windhoek: Environmental Economics Unit, Ministry 
of Environment and Tourism. 
Barreix, A (2003): “Rates of return, taxation and the economic cost of capital in Uruguay”. 
Unpublished  Ph  D  dissertation,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts, 
United States. 
Berman, JR (1986): “Shadow prices and subsidies in Botswana”. Journal of Development 
Economics, 22(2):351–392. 
Bicak, BA, GP Jenkins, C Kuo & MB Mphahlele (2004): “An operational guide to the 
estimation  of  the  economic  opportunity  cost  of  labour  in  South  Africa”.  South 
African Journal of Economics, 72(5):1056–1067. 
Boardman,  A,  D  Greenberg,  A  Vining  &  D  Weimer  (2001):  Cost-benefit  analysis: 
Concepts and practice (2nd edition). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Boscolo, M, J Vincent, & T Panayotou (1998): “Discounting costs and benefits in Carbon 
Sequestration  Projects”.  Harvard  Environment  Discussion  Paper  No.  41. 
Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development. 
Campbell, H & R Brown (2003): Benefit-cost analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 







Central Bureau of Statistics (2006): Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
2003/2004. Windhoek: National Planning Commission. 
Dasgupta, P, S Marglin & AK Sen (1972): Guidelines for project evaluation. New York: 
United Nations. 
Evans,  D  &  H  Sezer  (2004):  “Social  discount  rates  for  six  major  countries”.  Applied 
Economic Letters, 11(9):557–560. 
Fitch Ratings Agency (2005): Sovereign Report: Namibia. London: Fitch Ratings Agency.  
Flatters, F & M Stern (2005): “Implementing the SACU revenue-sharing formula: Customs 
Revenue”. Mimeo. 
Frayne, B & W Pendleton (2001): “Migration in Namibia: Combining macro and micro 
approaches  to  research  design  and  analysis”.  International  Migration  Review, 
35(4):1054–1085. 
Frayne,  B  &  W  Pendleton  (2002):  “Mobile  Namibia:  Migration  trends  and  attitudes”. 
Southern African Migration Project Migration Policy Series No. 27. 
Harberger,  AC  (1972):  “The  opportunity  costs  of  public  investment  financed  by 
borrowing”. In Layard, Richard (Ed.). Cost-benefit analysis. New York: Penguin 
Books Ltd. 
Harberger,  AC  &  GP  Jenkins  (Eds)  (2002):  Cost–benefit  analysis.  London/New  York: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Harberger, AC, GP Jenkins, CY Kuo & MB Mphahlele (2003): “The economic cost of 
foreign  exchange  for  South  Africa”.  South  African  Journal  of  Economics, 
71(2):298–324. 
Harris,  JR & MP Todaro (1970): “Migration,  unemployment and  development:  A  two-







International  Monetary  Fund  (2008):  Namibia  Selected  Issues  and  Statistical  Appendix. 
Washington DC: IMF. 
Jenkins GP & CY Kuo (1998): “Estimation of the national parameters for economic cost–
benefit  analysis  for  the  Philippines”.  Development  Discussion  Papers  No.  653. 
Cambridge: Harvard Institute for International Development. 
Khan, MZ (1979): “Estimation of shadow prices for project evaluation in Pakistan”. The 
Pakistan Development Review, 18(2):129–145. 
Kirk, R & M Stern (2005): “The new Southern African Customs Union Agreement”. World 
Economy, 28(2):169–190. 
Kuo, CY, GP Jenkins & MB Mphahlele (2003): “The economic cost of capital in South 
Africa”. The South African Journal of Economics, 71(3):523–543. 
Lagman-Martin, A (2004): “Shadow exchange rates for project economic analysis: Toward 
improving  practice  at  the  Asian  Development  Bank”.  Economic  &  Research 
Department Technical Note No. 11. Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
LARRI/Labour Resource and Research Institute (2005): The Namibian Wage Bargaining 
Report 2004. Windhoek: LARRI. 
LARRI/Labour Resource and Research Institute (2006a): The Namibian Wage Bargaining 
Report 2005. Windhoek: LARRI. 
LARRI/Labour  Resource  and  Research  Institute  (2006b):  Namibia’s  informal  economy: 
Possibilities for trade union intervention. Windhoek: LARRI. 
Little, IMD & JA Mirrlees (1969): Manual of Industrial Project Analysis in Developing 
Countries. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Marope, MT (2005): “Namibian human capital and knowledge development for economic 
growth with equity. Africa region human development”. Working Paper Series No. 







Medalla,  EM  (1982):  “Shadow  prices  of  goods  and  resources  in  the  Philippines:  An 
assessment”.  Staff  Paper  Series  No.  82–4.  Manila:  Philippine  Institute  for 
Development Studies. 
Medalla, EM & T Powers (1984): “Estimating the shadow exchange rate, the shadow wage 
rate and the social rate of discount for the Philippines”.  Staff Paper Series No. 84–
03. Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
MIDSA/Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (2006): MIDSA Workshop on Migration 
and Development/Poverty in the SADC Region: Final Report. Kingston: Queens 
University. 
Ministry of Finance (2003): 2003/04 Budget Speech. Windhoek: Ministry of Finance. 
Ministry of Labour (2001): The Namibian Informal Economy Survey: Report of analysis. 
Windhoek: Ministry of Labour. 
Ministry  of  Labour  (2002):  The  Namibia  Labour  Force  Survey  2002:  Final  report. 
Windhoek: Ministry of Labour. 
Ministry  of  Labour  (2005):  The  Namibia  Labour  Force  Survey  2004:  Final  report. 
Windhoek: Ministry of Labour. 
Motinga, D & G Mohammed (2002): “On the causes and consequences of globalization: 
What implications for the Namibian labour market?”. NEPRU Working Paper 85. 
Windhoek: Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit. 
Motinga, D & C Tutalife (2006): Joblessness and public policy: Evaluating the labour 
market impact of fiscal and labour market policies in Namibia. Windhoek: Institute 
of Public Policy Research. 
Percoco, M & P Nijkamp (2006): “Individuals‟ time preference and social discounting: A 







Potts, D (2002): Project planning and analysis for development. London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Powers, A (2003): Benefit–cost analysis and the discount rate for the Corps of Engineers’ 
water  resource  projects:  Theory  and  practice.  Washington,  DC:  Congressional 
Research Services, The Library of Congress. 
South African Reserve Bank (Various): Quarterly Bulletin. Pretoria: SARB. 
The  Service  Group  (2005):  The  Namibia  Investor  Roadmap.  Report  prepared  for  the 
Regional  Center  for  Southern  Africa.  Windhoek:  United  States  Agency  for 
International Development. 
Tinbergen, J (1958): The design of development. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 
Tjirongo, M (1995): “Short-term stabilization versus long-term price stability: Evaluating 
Namibia‟s membership of the Common Monetary Area”. Centre for the Study of 
African Economies Working Paper 95–18. Oxford: Oxford University. 
Vollan,  B  (2000):  “The  development  of  financial  markets  in  Namibia”.  South  African 
Journal of Economics, 68(1):63–97. 
Westergaard-Nielsen, N, D Hansohm & D Motinga (2003):  “Analysis of the Namibian 
labour market: The demand side”. Unpublished draft for World Bank. Windhoek. 
World Bank (2006): World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Group. 
Zerbe, JR & D Dively (1994): Benefit–cost analysis: In theory and practice. New York: 
Harper Collins. 
Zhang, J, Z Liang, T Lin & F de Guzman (2007): “Theory and practice in the choice of 
social  discount  rate  for  cost-benefit  analysis:  A  survey”.  Economic  &  Research 









The economic opportunity cost of capital 
 
Theoretically, the social rate of return may be defined by applying national accounting 
principles. In an open economy, real income can be different from real product because of 
the servicing of national debt. Let us assume that s is the average interest rate on the stock 
of foreign debt (D). Then income Y is given by – 
 
  Y = q - s .D  (1) 
 
where q is the real product. If we then consider a new public project, – 
 
  D i I I f p g        . . .     (2) 
 
where ∆q= p g I I    . .   . ∆q is the permanent change in real product, ∆Ig is the new public 
project, δ is the rate of return of the project, ∆Ip is the change in private investment caused 
by the new project (∆Ip<0),   is the marginal rate of return that the postponed investment 
would  have  generated,  if  is  the  marginal  cost  of  additional  foreign  borrowing,  and  ∆D 
represents the change in the external debt stock. 
 
The decision rule for accepting the project is that the discounted stream of extra income 
(∆Y) must be higher than the consumption forgone now (change in savings ∆S). Thus, the 
project should be accepted if the following condition can be satisfied: 












  (3) 
 
This can then be rewritten as follows: 
 
  S r Y      (4) 
 
Substituting (2) into (4) gives us – 
 
  S r D i I I f p g            (5) 
  p f g I D i S r I            (6) 
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Thus, where εs is the supply elasticity of household savings, εf is the supply elasticity of 
foreign funds and η is the elasticity of demand for domestic investment relative to changes 
in the interest rates. St is the total savings available in the economy, of which Sr is the 
contribution to the total savings by households, and Sf is the total contribution of net foreign 
capital inflows. 
 
Barreix  (2003)  mentions  that  only  this  market-driven  opportunity  cost  approach  is 
sufficiently flexible to easily add a new source of financing to the analysis. This approach 
also has another important advantage: it can be defined as a single value. Thus, no extra 
adjustment on investment expenditures is required, and no classification of benefits and 
costs are needed. 
 
Barreix (2003) surveys the empirical literature on the estimation of the shadow price of 
capital and finds that most studies – especially those relating to developing countries – have 
used the EOCK approach. The standard method for estimating the EOCK for developing 
countries is captured in the work of Jenkins and Kuo (1998), where it is measured as a 
weighted average of the rate of time preference to savers (), the cost of additional foreign 
capital inflows (MC), and the rate of return on displaced investment (). The weighted 
average of these three costs can be expressed as follows: 
 
  EOCK = f1   + f2  MCf + f3    (13) 
 
where , MCf and  , respectively, equal the costs of the public sector funds obtained at the 







economy, and at the expense of other domestic investment. The cost of foreign borrowing 
(MCf) is valued at its marginal cost. The weights (f1, f2, and f3) are the shares derived earlier, 
and are equal to the proportion of funds diverted or sourced from each sector. 
 
If the weights are expressed in terms of elasticities of demand and supply of funds with 
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